How many of us have ever uttered the following phrase: “I hope this works!”?

Without a doubt, most of us have, likely more than once. It’s not a phrase that inspires confidence, as it reveals doubts about our abilities or the functionality of whatever we are testing. Unfortunately, this very phrase defines our traditional security model all too well. We operate based on the assumption and the hope that the controls we put in place—from vulnerability scanning on web applications to anti-virus on endpoints—prevent malicious actors and software from entering our systems and damaging or stealing our information.

Penetration testing took a step to combat relying on assumptions by actively trying to break into the network, inject malicious code into a web application, or spread “malware” by sending out phishing emails. Composed of finding and poking holes in our different security layers, pen testing fails to account for situations in which holes are actively opened. In security experimentation, we intentionally create chaos in the form of controlled, simulated incident behavior to objectively instrument our ability to detect and deter these types of activities.

“Security experimentation provides a methodology for the experimentation of the security of distributed systems to build confidence in the ability to withstand malicious conditions.”

When it comes to security and complex distributed systems, a common adage in the chaos engineering community reiterates that “hope is not an effective strategy.” How often do we proactively instrument what we have designed or built to determine if the controls are failing? Most organizations do not discover that their security controls are failing until a security incident results from that failure. We believe that “Security incidents are not detective measures” and “Hope is not an effective strategy” should be the mantras of IT professionals

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